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Abstract—A cloud provider that can technically deter-
mine tenants’ operations may be compelled to disclose
such activities by law enforcement agencies (LEAs). The
situation gets even more complex when multiple LEAs
across different jurisdictions are involved, e.g., because of
the distributed locations of cloud servers and data storage.
Yet cloud providers typically do not need or want to know
about their tenants’ activities, other than measuring how
such activities incur expenses for using cloud resources.
Thus mechanisms should be developed for cloud
providers to have sufficient plausible deniability with re-
gards to the processing being carried out by tenants on
their platform, in jurisdictions that permit cloud providers
to avoid liabilities in this way. Symmetrically, such mech-
anisms could protect tenants from legal over-reach, for
example, when the country in which the cloud provider
is incorporated could force disclosure of the processing
carried out by cloud tenants.
But to what extent can cloud providers acquire plausi-
ble deniability? Current discussions regarding risk have
focused on data confidentiality and integrity. We ar-
gue that processing operations can equally reveal sen-
sitive information—such as trade secrets and business
processes—and that for some classes of application both
data protection and algorithm protection are necessary.
In this paper, we examine the legal and technical
motivations for achieving plausible deniability in cloud
interactions. We demonstrate the likely performance over-
head of using containers secured with technologies such as
Intel SGX. Further, we examine the current limitations of
our proposed plausible deniability mechanisms, and outline
a potential approach for enabling lawful access to enclaves
subject to appropriate judicial oversight.
Index Terms—Enclave, Deniability, Legal, Cloud
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the last decade cloud computing has become an
integral part of most company IT provisioning. Nonethe-
less, in many cases usage of cloud computing is affected
by concerns about the security and privacy of data and
processing [1], [2], [3].
Cloud tenants must trust that cloud providers will
carry out processing and storage of their data more
effectively than tenants can themselves. In terms of
technology, the major commercial cloud providers have
access to vast economies of scale, and thus are highly
likely to be able to provide services efficiently. There
have been surprisingly few major security incidents
affecting large cloud providers, most probably because
they devote significant attention to security matters—the
reputation of their brand is critical. However, the actual
legal guarantees [4], [5] cloud providers give tenants may
not be fully satisfactory.
Indeed, new laws such as the Clarifying Lawful
Overseas Use of Data Act (Cloud Act [6]) in the US
empower LEAs to demand access from entities subject
to US jurisdiction to data stored in foreign jurisdictions.
Cloud tenants can therefore have reasonable concerns
their information (including sensitive data and business
processes) could be disclosed to third-parties like LEAs.
Similarly the China National Intelligence Law [7] re-
quires companies and citizens to collaborate with the
government.
A solution for these cloud tenants is to host data
and run computing on cloud providers such that those
providers have no useful visibility of the data or trans-
formations of it. We will demonstrate how commodity
trusted hardware within modern CPUs can solve this
problem.
In this paper, however, we also highlight that the
cloud provider should actually share their tenants’ desire
not to be able to see or interpret their tenants’ data or
processing, for a combination of legal and operational
reasons (e.g., to reduce the costs associated with han-
dling legal requests from LEAs). The aim is to support
plausible deniability for the cloud provider in terms of
the processing and storage carried out by tenants. We
explore the likely overhead of a readily-available techni-
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cal mechanism. Nonetheless, we highlight that plausible
deniability is likely to be only partly achieved. We
discuss what exposure cloud providers might continue
to have, but also propose that the remaining exposure is
likely to be manageable in the face of legal requests.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: in the
next section (§ II) we discuss the background knowledge
underpinning our vision. § III explores the legal moti-
vation in more detail. § IV describes our assumptions,
particularly our supported security threat model. In § V
we present our architecture and detail the components
within it. We discuss key challenges in realising our
vision in § VI. Finally § VII indicates future research
that we plan to undertake, and concludes the paper.
II. BACKGROUND
Secure cloud computing. There exist a variety of poten-
tial mechanisms for protecting data and computation on
remote cloud infrastructure. Techniques such as database
encryption [8] are straightforward to implement, but
either do not protect data in memory or do not sup-
port general purpose applications [9]. More advanced
homomorphic encryption techniques [10] allow for com-
putation over encrypted data, but fully homomorphic
encryption is prohibitively expensive. In this paper, we
focus instead on hardware-enforced trusted execution
environments, which can protect code and data of general
purpose applications on remote cloud computers with
reasonable overhead.
Early trusted execution proposals primarily lever-
aged widely available trusted platform module (TPM)
chips [11], [12], [13], but either suffered from poor
performance or did not provide full confidentiality. We
focus instead on a recently available trusted execution
technology for commodity CPUs (Intel SGX), which
provides strong security guarantees for general-purpose
applications with low overhead.
Intel SGX Enclaves. In 2015, Intel released the Soft-
ware Guard Extensions (SGX) for their CPUs, which
support the creation of trusted execution environments
called enclaves [14]. Critically, an enclave shields appli-
cation code and data from higher privileged software,
including the OS, hypervisor and BIOS, by transpar-
ently encrypting and integrity protecting enclave memory
pages at runtime. Enclaves also protect against attackers
with physical access, assuming the CPU package is not
breached. Enclaves therefore offer a promising solution
for protecting the confidentiality and integrity of ap-
plications running on remote cloud infrastructure from
incompetent or malicious employees of cloud providers.
Enclave memory protection. Enclave code and data
reside in a region of protected physical memory called
the enclave page cache (EPC). Only application code
executing inside the enclave is permitted to access the
EPC. Enclave code can access the memory outside the
enclave. An on-chip memory encryption engine encrypts
and decrypts EPC cache lines written to and fetched
from memory. As enclave code is always executed in
user mode, any interaction with the OS through system
calls, e.g., for network or disk I/O, must execute outside
of the enclave.
Enclave lifecycle. Developers can create enclave li-
braries (e.g., using Intel’s SGX SDK [15]), that are
loaded into an enclave and executed by a CPU with
SGX support. Enclaves are created by untrusted code
using the ECREATE instruction, which initialises an
SGX enclave control structure (SECS) in the EPC. The
EADD instruction adds pages to the enclave. When all
enclave pages are loaded, the EINIT instruction creates
a cryptographic measurement of the enclave contents.
After enclave initialisation, an unprivileged application
can execute enclave code through the EENTER instruc-
tion, which switches the CPU to enclave mode and
jumps to a predefined enclave offset. Conversely, the
EEXIT instruction causes a thread to leave the enclave.
A developer defines the interface between the enclave
code and other, untrusted application code: a call into
the enclave is referred to as an enclave entry call (ecall);
outside calls (ocalls) allow enclave functions to call
untrusted functions outside.
Remote attestation. A remote party can verify the
integrity of an enclave [16]. Based on the measurement
during enclave initialisation, a dedicated quoting enclave
signs the measurement using a secret CPU key. Intel
provides an auxiliary attestation service to verify the
validity of the signed measurements. Enclaves allow data
to be written to persistent storage securely—a process
known as sealing. Sealed data can be bound to a signing
authority, which allows enclaves to persist state across
reboots. Any enclave signed by the same authority can
subsequently unseal it.
III. LEGAL MOTIVATION
The legal landscape surrounding cloud computing is
evolving quickly and is becoming increasingly compli-
cated with multiple overlapping national, international
and supranational regimes governing data privacy, cyber-
crime and LEA access to foreign data.1 After years
of outdated and inadequate data privacy laws2, which
were unfit for the modern digital age, many jurisdictions
are now introducing new laws, such as the General
Data Protection Regulation, which protect personal data
rights. At the same time, jurisdictions like the US have
also introduced new laws, such as the Cloud Act3, to
1see Code de Proce´dure Pe´nale [C. Pr. Pe´n.] [Criminal Procedure
Code] art. 57-1 (Fr.); Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law
of the United States § 442; Article 48, GDPR; 9 Council of Europe
Convention on Cybercrime 23 Nov. 2001, S. Treaty Doc. No. 11, 108th
Cong., 1st Sess. (2003), 2296 U.N.T.S. 167 (Cybercrime Convention);
2e.g., Data Protection Directive, UK Data Protection Act 1998
3Clarifying Lawful Overseas Use of Data (CLOUD) Act, H.R. 1625,
115th Cong. div. V (2018) (enacted) (to be codified in scattered sections
of 18 U.S.C.).
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improve their access to data stored in other jurisdictions
for purposes such as law enforcement.
In this section we will focus on Part 1 of the Cloud
Act, its implications for cloud providers when it comes
to granting access to cloud data to LEAs, and the
potential legal ramifications of enclave technology for
cloud providers. It is beyond the scope of this paper
to explore the relationship between the Cloud Act, the
GDPR and the Cybercrime Convention. We also do not
consider Part 2 of the Cloud Act which enables the US
to enter in executive data access agreements with foreign
countries.
Cloud Act overview. Part 1 of the Cloud Act specifies
that service providers, such as cloud providers, are
required to disclose all data in their possession, custody,
or control, pursuant to lawful process, regardless of
its location4 as long a number of conditions are met
including:
• the US has persona jurisdiction over the target
entity;
• the entity is an electronic communication service
or remote computing service provider which falls
within the ambit of the Cloud Act;
• the target entity has possession, custody or control
over the data being sought;
• LEAs have to follow the legal process to obtain
access to all data including establishing ‘probable
cause’ for certain content.
Once these requirements are met, LEAs gain access to
the data (e.g., communication contents, stored data and
account information) in question by serving a warrant or
subpoena on the cloud provider in question.
The target entity can challenge a warrant by arguing
that one or more of the statutory conditions are not met.
For example, a cloud provider can put forward a cogent
case that it does not possess or have control or custody
of stored encrypted data because the data or business
processes are not accessible (see § V for how this can be
technically enacted). This means that access to the data
can only be provided by the cloud tenant who possesses
the corresponding secret key.
The meaning of the phrase ‘possession, custody or
control’ has been extensively litigated in other contexts
in the US. Although it is straightforward to determine
if the target entity has possession or custody of the data
by evaluating whether it has physical possession of the
data, the issue of control from a legal perspective is
more complex. Typically in the US, courts apply one of
two tests to determine if the cloud provider has ‘control’
of the data [17]. The first test is the ‘practical ability’
test which requires the courts to evaluate factors such
as common ownership, common directorship, exchange
of data in normal course of business and the financial
4H.R. 1625, 115th Cong. div. V, § 103(a) (2018) (enacted) (to be
codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2713).
relationship between the US and foreign company. If the
courts find that an entity can demand or have access
to certain data in the normal course of business, the
presumption is that the data is within the control of the
entity. The ‘legal right’ test is the second, stricter and less
common test which the courts could apply to determine
control.5 Here, control is determined by looking at the
legal entitlement of the entity over the data held by the
foreign company.
The requirement of control, possession or custody
can limit LEAs’ access to cloud data. Likewise, LEAs
have to follow the legal process to obtain access to the
data under the Cloud Act. For example, LEAs have to
meet certain standards of proof to obtain the customer
information of a remote computing service or electronic
communication service. These standards will depend on
the type of information sought. LEAs also need to obtain
a search warrant from a judge to access the content of
electronic communications which have been in storage
for less than 180 days. LEAs can only obtain a search
warrant if they establish ‘probable cause’ or a ‘fair
probability’ that evidence of crime can be found in the
location on the basis of available evidence.6 Access to
this type of data cannot be secured unless this standard
is met. Even for data stored longer than 180 days,
LEAs can only access such data through a subpoena
or court order which, while not requiring ‘probable
cause’, do require LEAs to show connection between
the information sought and a lawful investigation.
Legal implications of enclaves. Consequently, returning
to the scenario where data or business processes are not
intelligible to the cloud provider because an enclave-like
technology is used, the cloud provider has an arguable
case to challenge a warrant on a number of grounds.
It could argue that although it has physical custody or
possession of the data on its servers, it actually does not
have ‘control’ over the data because it does not meet the
requirements of the ‘practical ability’ test. For example,
although the data is physically stored on its server, it
cannot demand or have access to the stored data in an
intelligible way in the normal course of business because
of its contractual and technical arrangements with the
cloud tenant.
At worst, a warrant or subpoena should target both the
cloud provider and cloud tenant so that the LEAs can
access the data or business processes in question in an
intelligible manner. In case the courts rely on the stricter
legal entitlement test to determine control, depending on
the circumstances the cloud provider could argue that
this test also fails because, for example, it is not legally
entitled to access the data in intelligible form as per
its contract with the cloud tenant. Our position is that
5United States v. Int’l Union of Petroleum & Indus. Workers, AFL-
CIO, 870 F.2d 1450, 1452 (9th Cir. 1989).
6e.g., United States v. Perkins, 850 F. 3d 1109, 1119 (9th Cir. 2017).
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the technical mechanisms provided by trusted hardware,
such as Intel’s SGX enclaves, can render pointless search
warrants from LEAs that seek to have the cloud provider
retrieve the code and/or data of their tenants.
One possible reaction that LEAs might have is to
seek a ban or control on the use of technologies such
as SGX enclaves, because of the potentially relevant
information that enclaves render inaccessible (a similar
debate resurfaces regularly regarding encryption [18],
[19]). We are not aware of any push toward such bans,
not least since such regulatory power would be well
beyond any given LEA. Given that no single jurisdiction
controls CPU designs, or the key organisations within
the CPU industry, it seems unlikely that such restrictions
would be effective.
Another option for LEAs would be to seek to have
access to a backdoor mechanism into the SGX enclaves.
However this again has the problem that Intel’s opera-
tions span multiple jurisdictions, and are well beyond the
scope of any given LEA. Because the security of CPUs
is so fundamental to all computing it is unlikely that
regulation to modify its operation will be easily effected.
Furthermore, from the perspective of the cloud provider
a backdoor mechanism most likely would not require
any cooperation or additional effort, thereby offloading
associated legal concerns and costs to Intel.
IV. ASSUMPTIONS & THREAT MODEL
This vision paper is based on the following assump-
tions:
• We assume that data processed by an enclave ser-
vice is kept encrypted (or is non-sensitive) when at
rest, and only decrypted within the enclave.
• We assume that enclave-like technologies can be
made secure. Many vulnerabilities and side chan-
nels exist in the current Intel SGX implemen-
tation [20], [21], [22], however, such issues are
related to decisions in hardware design and imple-
mentation, and do not disqualify such technology
overall.
• As discussed in previous sections, we assume the
cloud provider has an incentive to guarantee that
they cannot access tenant data or business logic.
The cloud provider business model relies on trust,
and attempts to break the proposed service model
are likely to damage the cloud provider’s reputation
beyond repair. This would inevitably result in a
reduction of its customer base. Consequently, we
consider cloud providers to be willing participants.
• An explicit non-goal are threats from determined
state actors that bypass legal due process. We aim to
isolate the activities of cloud tenants and providers,
such that one cannot be targeted through the other.
We do not want tenants to avoid justice, but for
the judicial process to target tenants directly and
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Fig. 1. Plausible deniability architecture.
to avoid information disclosure through judicial
pressure on a third party (i.e., the cloud-provider).
V. ARCHITECTURE & PROOF OF CONCEPT
Having outlined our legal motivation for plausible de-
niability, in this section we introduce an architecture and
workflow for achieving it (Figure 1). The architecture
consists of both client-side and cloud components, where
the client-side is assumed to be under tenant control.
The tenant initiates deployment at the client side 1 ,
where it gathers the application code and data and then
encrypts it using an encryption tool and a secret key 2 .
The tenant then uploads the encrypted code and data to
the cloud, where a new enclave is created containing an
unencrypted loader and the encrypted application code
and data 3 . The loader creates an attestation report using
the Intel SGX attestation infrastructure, which the tenant
uses to remotely attest the state of the enclave. If satisfied
with the attestation, the tenant and loader establish a
secure channel over which the decryption key for the
application code and data is provisioned 4 .
A. Key aspects of architecture
From the perspective of plausible deniability, there are
several key aspects of the architecture.
Dynamic encrypted code loading: By default, code
(and data) copied into the enclave during creation is
visible to the untrusted host. In scenarios where a tenant
wishes to hide its code from the cloud provider (e.g.,
to protect trade secrets), the tenant must encrypt its
sensitive code and use a dynamic loader to decrypt it
at runtime inside the enclave [23], [24]. The source
code of the loader must be available to the tenant
to allow it to verify the loader’s behaviour and also
to check the contents of the enclave during remote
attestation. After decrypting the application code inside
the enclave, the loader restricts page privileges to harden
the enclave code against software vulnerabilities where
possible (e.g., when JIT compilation is not required).
However, dynamic encrypted code loading may increase
the time taken to create a new enclave, which may be
important for applications that rely on fast spawning of
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new enclaves (e.g., serverless frameworks). We evaluate
the overhead of encrypted code loading in § V-C.
Generic Enclave Interface: Our architecture is purpose-
fully agnostic to the interface exposed by the enclave to
the untrusted host. If the enclave includes the complete
application [25], [26], [27], the interface will typically
correspond closely to the OS system call interface (e.g.,
POSIX), or some subset of it. Alternatively, for appli-
cations concerned with reducing the trusted computing
based (TCB) inside the enclave, a more specialised
interface may be preferable [28]. We note however
that for tenants wishing to hide the nature of their
application through dynamic encrypted code loading, a
more specialised interface may leak information through
offline inspection of the declared ecalls and ocalls.
Convenient Application Construction: To minimise the
reengineering effort required to run legacy applications
within SGX enclaves, the architecture does not impose
any restrictions on the toolchain used, except that it must
be possible to encrypt and decrypt the output of the
toolchain for dynamic loading.
Secure communication: To hide the data coming into
and out of the application from the cloud provider, the
tenant should terminate any encrypted communication
channels inside the enclave (e.g., TLS endpoints [29],
although other secure communication protocols may also
be used).
B. Enclave Overheads
Shifting software into SGX enclaves will have a
performance penalty, both in terms of the time required
to load and start software, the time to read and write data
contained within encrypted pages in main memory, and
in terms of the cost of interacting with the underlying
operating system.
Previous work has attempted to address some of these
enclave performance challenges. For example, data par-
titioning schemes [28] allow some non-sensitive data to
be stored unencrypted in main memory (still accessible
to enclaves). SCONE demonstrated how the cost of
operating system interactions can be reduced by passing
data through main memory buffers to avoid hardware
threads performing calls in and out of the enclave [25].
Thus from a tenant’s perspective, SGX enclaves can
achieve pratical performance for a variety of different
application workloads.
From a cloud provider’s perspective, the limited size
of enclave memory on current SGX hardware remains a
deployment barrier, since it must be virtualized across all
tenants on a physical machine [30]. SGXv2’s support for
dynamic memory management [31] may help to mitigate
this issue, as might future increases in EPC size, but this
is still an area of active research.
C. Overhead from encrypted code loading
Given other aspects of enclave execution perfor-
mance in cloud settings have been studied in previous
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Fig. 2. Overhead from using encrypted enclave code
work [25], [30], in this section we analyse additional
performance overheads specific to plausible deniability
for cloud providers. Concretely, we evaluate the potential
overhead of dynamic encrypted code loading, and in
particular its impact on enclave startup time.
Experiment Setup: All experiments are conducted on
an SGX-capable machine with 4 Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU
E3-1240 v5 3.50GHz cores (8 hyperthreaded) and 16GB
RAM. Our test applications are implemented using the
Intel SGX Linux SDK version 2.5, executing on Ubuntu
Linux 16.04. We use the encryption tool and protected
code loader provided by the SDK to encrypt test appli-
cations, and measure the time taken to create enclaves
with decrypted applications of increasing size.
Results: Figure 2 shows the time taken to create an en-
clave as we increase the application size with both plain-
text and dynamic encrypted code loading. For smaller
enclave sizes, the overhead of decryption is minimal in
comparison to the fixed costs of creating the enclave. For
an enclave of 1MB, the overhead is 12%. However, as
enclave size increases to 200MB, the overhead in terms
of startup delay increases to 64%.
While the above results indicate a substantial perfor-
mance impact for large enclaves, there are several po-
tential mitigations. Firstly, for many applications enclave
creation happens infrequently and is not on the critical
path. Secondly, it should be possible to extend our loader
to lazily decrypt code and/or data just before it is needed,
avoiding the worst-case overhead in many scenarios.
VI. CHALLENGES FACED IN ACHIEVING PLAUSIBLE
DENIABILITY
A. Technical Challenges
Even with the proposed vision relying on Intel SGX
to hide tenants’ code and data from cloud providers,
there are a number of remaining challenges for the
community to tackle in terms of achieving practical
plausible deniability.
Side-channel attacks: As noted above (see § IV),
current SGX implementations have vulnerabilities due
to side-channels [20], [21], [22]. Mitigating these at-
tacks may involve significant performance impacts, on
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the basis of mitigations seen so far for problems with
speculative execution.
Were some side-channel vulnerabilities to remain un-
mitigated, it is not clear whether LEAs would request
remote or even physical access in order to mount such
side-channel attacks against the targets of warrants. Like-
wise, it would need to be tested whether LEAs would
need to demonstrate that they could mount a side-channel
attack in order to obtain a warrant in the first place.
The same questions would also apply to fault injection
attacks [32].
Behavioural fingerprinting: Dynamically loading en-
crypted enclave code helps protect the business logic of a
tenant’s application. However, without further effort, the
externally observable behaviour of an application (e.g.,
memory access patterns, network interaction and other
system calls) will often allow for identification of the
class of application executing within the enclave, e.g.,
web server-like, VPN-like, etc. This could give probable
cause for further legal requests. We assume tenants wish-
ing to further mask the behaviour of their application
will implement application-specific hardening techniques
(e.g., by imitating a different class of application or
using anonymous communication mechanisms such as
TOR [33] or Vuvuzela [34] to hide network interactions).
The challenge is to assess whether it is worth a
cloud provider trying to avoid warrants based on their
computational infrastructure, if warrants can be served
on them regarding records of their network activity.
B. Socio-ethical Challenges
One of the argument against the development of
the proposed solution is the fact that this could help
malicious individuals to deploy applications that escape
control of law enforcement agencies and other govern-
mental bodies. We believe those fears to be as misguided
as those targetted towards encryption technology (e.g.,
see recent noise over DNS over HTTPS). In the rest of
this section, we discuss why it may be legitimate to force
LEAs to interact directly with tenants rather than access
being granted through the underlying cloud provider.
First of all, it is important to keep in mind that one
person’s “benign government” can be someone else’s
“malicious state actor”. As discussed in § III, a cloud
provider may be forced by law to disclose information
to state actors. This may be not be in the interest of
the cloud provider nor the cloud tenant. We do argue
that the majority of cloud providers would prefer to be
considered as providing a sort of “utility service”, where
the tenant should be the one legally responsible and
targetted by a disclosure request. The current situation
puts cloud providers and cloud tenants in a clearly
uncomfortable situation, especially as the international
regulation is evolving relatively quickly. For example,
the current US government and emerging legislation are
causing major concerns in the European Union which in
turn is creating push back from US actors (so called
European “digital sovereignty” [35]). In this context,
the proposed approach provides a technical solution that
alleviates some of those concerns (please see technical
caveats discussed in § VI-A).
Second, the request for data access by LEAs can be
opaque and not open to public scrutiny. When an LEA
wants access to some data it generally must go through
a judge who creates a sealed order to be presented to
the cloud provider. The cloud provider may challenge
the sealed order or comply. The sealed order may be
unsealed and revealed to the public after a certain amount
of time as defined during its issue. However, a report [36]
has shown that no systematic mechanism exists to unseal
orders. Which means that a tenant may never discover
that it has been targetted by an LEA. Further, as the
order is sealed and may remain so, it is impossible to
ensure that the cloud provider and the LEA are working
within the remit of the court order. This ties back to
fear, for example, in the European Union that American
“giants” may be to willing to cooperate with US LEAs,
potentially subjecting European citizens and companies
to surveillance.
VII. CONCLUSION
There is a pragmatic basis for a cloud provider to seek
to achieve plausible deniability about the specific code
and data of their tenants, and thus avoid LEAs’ warrants
for access to the cloud provider’s systems. This avoids
risks to the provider of needing to resource answering
LEAs’ requests, and the risk of damage to their image,
globally.
Trusted hardware such as Intel SGX supports a cloud
software architecture we have presented and demon-
strated, which can facilitate tenants’ code and data
remaining encrypted, from the perspective of the cloud
provider. Further, based on our experiments on an initial
prototype system, the startup overhead of encrypting
code as well as data ranges from 16% to 64% depending
on the size of the code and data to load into the enclave.
We are confident that further engineering effort would
significantly improve this performance.
We discuss legal perspectives regarding recent cloud
regulation and note that while warrants prepared for
LEAs will be rare, it is likely that courts will accept
the futility of trying to access purely encrypted data,
should the cloud provider use the architecture proposed
in this paper. Courts will likely target tenants directly,
thus simplifying the cloud provider’s role.
Finally, we discuss some research challenges that
remain to be solved, in order to significantly strengthen
the nature of plausible deniability that cloud providers
can achieve, in practice.
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